Web and Internet Economics [electronic resource] : 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings /
Material type: TextSeries: Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; 13112Publisher: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2022Edition: 1st ed. 2022Description: XIV, 558 p. 65 illus., 48 illus. in color. online resourceContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9783030946760
- Algorithms
- Artificial intelligence
- Electronic commerce
- Data structures (Computer science)
- Information theory
- Application software
- Computer science -- Mathematics
- Design and Analysis of Algorithms
- Artificial Intelligence
- e-Commerce and e-Business
- Data Structures and Information Theory
- Computer and Information Systems Applications
- Mathematics of Computing
- 005.13 23
- QA9.58
Mechanism Design and Pricing -- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality -- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials -- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing -- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design -- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss -- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances -- Contract Design for A orestation Programs -- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching -- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness -- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals -- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction -- Matching, Markets and Equilibria -- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model -- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis -- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home -- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods -- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem -- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy -- The Platform Design Problem -- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria -- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations -- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations -- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem -- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias -- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment -- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies -- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary -- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice -- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries -- Envy-free division ofmulti-layered cakes -- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.
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