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245 1 0 _aDecision and Game Theory for Security
_h[electronic resource] :
_b14th International Conference, GameSec 2023, Avignon, France, October 18–20, 2023, Proceedings /
_cedited by Jie Fu, Tomas Kroupa, Yezekael Hayel.
250 _a1st ed. 2023.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer Nature Switzerland :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2023.
300 _aXXIX, 390 p. 95 illus., 76 illus. in color.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
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347 _atext file
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490 1 _aLecture Notes in Computer Science,
_x1611-3349 ;
_v14167
505 0 _aMechanism design and imperfect information -- Observable Perfect Equilibrium -- Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with Small Manipulation Cost -- Rule Enforcing Through Ordering -- Security Games -- Multi-defender Security Games with Schedules -- Asymmetric Centrality Game against Network Epidemic Propagation -- Shades of Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles -- Learning in security games -- Characterizing and Improving the Robustness of Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworks -- Quantisation Effects in Adversarial Cyber-Physical GamesTakuma Adams -- Scalable Learning of Intrusion Responses through Recursive Decomposition -- Cyber deception -- Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach -- Optimal Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense with Deception in Probabilistic Attack Graphs -- The Credential is Not Enough: Combining Honeypots and Fake Credentials for Cyber-Defense -- Economics of security -- Does Cyber-insurance Benefit the Insured or the Attacker? -- A Game of Cyber-Insurance -- Rational Broadcast Protocols against Timid Adversaries -- FlipPath Game to Counter Stealthy Attacks in SDN-based Tactical Networks -- Information and privacy -- Double-sided Information Asymmetry in Double Extortion Ransomware -- Opacity-enforcing active perception and control against eavesdropping attacks -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd -- Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game with Mixed Armament -- Short articles -- Incentive-Based Software Security: Fair Micro-Payments for Writing Secure Code -- Using Game Theory Approach for COVID-19 Risk Analysis and Medical Resource Allocation -- Shapley Value to Rank Vulnerabilities on Attack Graphs: Applications to Cyberdeception -- Solving security models with perfect observability.
520 _aThis book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2023, held in Avignon, France, during October 18–20, 2023. The 19 full papers and 4 short papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 33 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Mechanism design and imperfect information, Security Games, Learning in security games, Cyber deception, Economics of security, Information and privacy and Short articles.
650 0 _aData protection.
650 0 _aComputer engineering.
650 0 _aComputer networks .
650 0 _aArtificial intelligence.
650 1 4 _aData and Information Security.
650 2 4 _aComputer Engineering and Networks.
650 2 4 _aArtificial Intelligence.
700 1 _aFu, Jie.
_eeditor.
_4edt
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 _aKroupa, Tomas.
_eeditor.
_4edt
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 _aHayel, Yezekael.
_eeditor.
_4edt
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031506697
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031506710
830 0 _aLecture Notes in Computer Science,
_x1611-3349 ;
_v14167
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50670-3
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