000 04819nam a22006255i 4500
001 978-3-319-96131-6
003 DE-He213
005 20240423130306.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 200922s2020 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783319961316
_9978-3-319-96131-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-96131-6
_2doi
050 4 _aQA76.9.A25
072 7 _aUR
_2bicssc
072 7 _aUTN
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM053000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aUR
_2thema
072 7 _aUTN
_2thema
082 0 4 _a005.8
_223
100 1 _aAlvim, Mário S.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 1 4 _aThe Science of Quantitative Information Flow
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Mário S. Alvim, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan, Catuscia Palamidessi, Geoffrey Smith.
250 _a1st ed. 2020.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2020.
300 _aXXVIII, 478 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aInformation Security and Cryptography,
_x2197-845X
505 0 _aPart I, Motivation -- Introduction -- Part II, Secrets and How to Measure Them -- Modeling Secrets -- On g-Vulnerability -- Part III, Channels and Information Leakage -- Channels -- Posterior Vulnerability and Leakage -- Robustness -- Capacity -- Composition of Channels -- Refinement -- The Dalenius Perspective -- Axiomatics -- The Geometry of Hypers, Gains, and Losses -- Part IV, Information Leakage in Sequential Programs -- Quantitative Information Flow in Sequential Computer Programs -- Hidden-Markov Modeling of QIF in Programs -- Program Algebra for QIF -- Iteration and Non-termination -- A Demonic Lattice of Information -- Part V, Applications -- The Crowds Protocol -- Timing Attacks on Blinded and Bucketed Cryptography -- Defense Against Side Channels -- Multi-party Computation: The Three Judges Protocol -- Voting Systems -- Differential Privacy -- Glossary and Index.
520 _a<p>This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively – so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated – and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable.</p><p>Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., "leaks", can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios.</p><p>The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook.</p>.
650 0 _aData protection.
650 0 _aData structures (Computer science).
650 0 _aInformation theory.
650 0 _aSoftware engineering.
650 1 4 _aData and Information Security.
650 2 4 _aData Structures and Information Theory.
650 2 4 _aSoftware Engineering.
700 1 _aChatzikokolakis, Konstantinos.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
700 1 _aMcIver, Annabelle.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
700 1 _aMorgan, Carroll.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
700 1 _aPalamidessi, Catuscia.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
700 1 _aSmith, Geoffrey.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319961293
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319961309
830 0 _aInformation Security and Cryptography,
_x2197-845X
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96131-6
912 _aZDB-2-SCS
912 _aZDB-2-SXCS
942 _cSPRINGER
999 _c187062
_d187062